Інституційні та структурні ефекти виборчої системи у місцевій виборчій кампанії-2020 (регіональний аспект)

Анотація

Статтю присвячено проблемам впливу виборчої системи на структурування електорального поля регіону та представництво політичних партій в органах місцевого самоврядування. Автор констатує, що впровадження нових електоральних правил на місцевих виборах 2020 року суттєво змінило позиції провідних електоральних акторів. Вплив проявився через інституційні («викривлене представництво», «розколоте голосування») та структурні («регіоналізація», «внутрішня конкуренція», «цілісність вибору») ефекти виборчої системи.

The article is devoted to the problems of the influence of the electoral system on the structuring of the electoral field in the region and the representation of political parties in local government. It is emphasized that due to the high size of the electoral deposit, the number of participants in the elections has significantly decreased in comparison with the previous electoral cycle. Also, due to legislative innovations, the possibility of political manipulation and the proportion of spoiled ballot have been increased. According to the author, the election results turned out to be extremely distorted due to the influence of the institutional and structural effects of the electoral system.

Institutional effects include disproportions in the representation of political parties in the regional council due to the higher activity of rural voters and low turnout in cities. The author shows that the greatest losses were incurred by the party “Ednannia” of the mayor of Zaporiozhzhia V. Buriak. The effect of “split voting” manifested itself through the differentiation of support for electoral actors when voting in regional, district and local councils. This indicator makes it possible to explain electoral behavior in different elections from the standpoint of the theory of “strategic voting", as well as to study the influence of the factor of "neighborhood" - voting on a territorial basis, “for local”. The most stable was the electorate of the Opposition Bloc, the EU and Servant of the People, and the most unstable was the Opposition Bloc.

Structural effects describe the impact of electoral rules on the promotion of candidates within party lists and are revealed using several indicators. The coefficient of regionalization indicates the share of deputies who received mandates in territorial districts, the coefficient of “internal competition” - the number of deputies who received more than a quarter of votes, the coefficient of “integrity of choice” is an indicator of the “pure” ideological electorate who voted for the party list as a whole.